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## SELECTIONS FROM SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY JOURNALS

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## ROLE OF REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES IN NATIONAL LIBERATION

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 8, Aug 81, pp 2-5

[Article by V. Chirkin, doctor of Juridical Sciences: "The Socialist Orientation Countries: The Development of Revolutionary Parties"]

[Text] In the socialist oriented countries, regardless of whether one party exists there (as, for example, in Tanzania), or whether there is a multi-party system (Madagascar), the ruling parties are parties which the XXVI CPSU Congress characterized as "revolutionary parties which express the interests of the broad masses of workers." In the past, in the scholarly literature, the collective term "revolutionary-democratic" was usually used in relation to these parties.<sup>1</sup> This term keeps its importance today. However, at the present time many parties are by no means limiting themselves to the accomplishment of general democratic tasks; they are directing the creation of the preconditions for a socialist society.

Such parties--sometimes through definite intermediate stages--are able to develop into the highest form of the revolutionary party--a communist party. This kind of process of development was passed through, in particular, by the Mongolian and Tuvin People's Revolutionary Parties in 1921-1940.<sup>2</sup> This path is also possible for a number of the ruling parties of the socialist orientation countries. "Under the specific conditions of Angola," the chairman of the NPLA Labor Party and President of the People's Republic of Angola Jose Eduardo dos Santos said at the XXVI CPSU Congress, "Our party is gradually establishing itself as a Marxist-Leninist party."

The revolutionary parties in the socialist orientation countries are passing through various stages of development (which are not at all mandatory for each party). In this connection, in the author's opinion, it is possible to distinguish national-democratic parties which act either in the form of a party-front or of a party-movement (for example, the Progressive Front of the People of the Seychelles Islands, the Movement for the Liberation of the Islands of Sao-Tome and Principe), or in the form of an extremely narrow "cadre" party which was created by a revolutionary council after a coup (for example, in Burma at the initial stages of development); the revolutionary-democratic parties of a quite wide block of forces with regard to their social and class composition which support the general democratic transformations being carried out by the government (the Algerian Front for National Liberation); and the revolutionary-democratic



vanguard workers' parties which in a number of countries, in essence, perform certain functions of a Marxist-Leninist party (these parties, as R. A. Ul'yanovskiy has observed, are at various stages of the approaches to scientific socialism).<sup>3</sup>

The creation of a vanguard revolutionary-democratic party, as practice has shown, can be realized over various routes. They depend upon a large number of causes and, first of all, upon the initial base of the movement.

Before the victory of liberation revolutions relatively organized parties existed only in isolated instances. In most countries the creation of revolutionary parties began during the anti-colonial struggle. The necessity for uniting diverse social strata in this struggle led to the fact that the new party was formed as the party-front or party-movement which included a substantial section and, sometimes, the majority of the adult population of the country. Later, a struggle between the right and left wings was characteristic for a number of these parties; some of them were transformed into narrower organizations.

In a number of countries the revolutionary parties arose after the establishment of people's power, but the process of their formation occurred in different ways. The creation of party-fronts and party-movements in this case was an exception (only in the Congo after the overthrow in 1963 of the government of Abbot F. Youlou was the People's Revolutionary Movement created; four years later it collapsed). In this case, there usually were formed at the beginning narrow "cadre" parties of conscious revolutionaries who numbered hundreds (Congo), and sometimes dozens of members (Burma). The remaining people who were entering the party were regarded as candidates or sympathizers. Only after many years some of these turned into mass revolutionary parties, while others have only just entered this path.

At the present time the ruling revolutionary parties differ essentially from one another in their quantitative and qualitative composition. They have from several thousand (7,000 in the Congo) to several million members (Guinea where there exists a special conception of party-state), while in certain countries they include only around .02% of the population, and in others the majority of the adult citizens.

An excessively narrow revolutionary party, like an excessively broad party-movement, does not accord with the demands which are made upon the workers' vanguard as the directing force of society under the conditions of a socialist orientation. In the first case, the size of the party is insufficient to cover and lead the popular masses, and in the second case, its fighting efficiency is lowered since the party is joined not only by advanced and active fighters for the socialist path of development, but also by fellow-travellers and even opponents of the socialist orientation.

During the course of the creation of a vanguard revolutionary-democratic party of the workers its size changes. On the basis of the individual admission of every member after the discussion of his candidacy at general meetings of the workers at enterprises, in institutions, and at residences there arises at first in the

party movement a quite numerous (several thousand people) nucleus of the new party (see Angola, Mozambique, and others). Its full development takes place on the basis of the admission of new members and the procedure stipulated by the charter.

The creation of the nucleus of a vanguard revolutionary-democratic workers' party and its further development are also possible in different ways. Thus, for several years after the formation of the Congolese Labor Party, it was very small in numbers: three years after its creation, in 1972, the party had 231 members, in 1974--1,423, in 1978--slightly more than 3,500, and in 1981--around 7,000 members. An analogous process is characteristic of the People's Revolutionary Party of Benin.

The Yemen Socialist Party has traversed a difficult path. The three progressive parties which were created during the struggle for independence (the National Front which played the chief role, the National Democratic Alliance, and the Party of the People's Vanguard) formed in 1975 a United Political Organization--the National Front--which became the base for the subsequent formation (on the basis of the individual admission of new members) of the vanguard party--the Yemen Socialist Party (1978).

In certain countries, however, when new parties were formed there was a simple unification of the previous ones. When the Revolutionary Party was created in Tanzania in 1977, the members of the two united organizations (the Tanganyika African National Union and the "Afro-Shirazi" Party) automatically became its members. An appendix to the Charter of the Progressive Front of the People of the Seychelles Islands (1979) also states that persons who were members of the United Party of the Seychelles People before its dissolution automatically become members of the Front if they wish to.

Ethiopia provides a special example of the formation of a new party. After unsuccessful attempts to unite on a Marxist platform several parties and political organizations whose leaders in words declared their recognition of Marxism-Leninism, the Provisional Military Administrative Council--the supreme body of state power--instituted with its decree of 1979 a Commission for the Organization of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia.. This Commission is the nucleus of the future party.

The role of the ruling revolutionary parties in the countries with a socialist orientation is defined by their charters in different ways. The 1979 Charter of the Congolese Party characterizes the party as "a vanguard organization of the Congolese working class" (Article 2) and states that "the Congolese Labor Party is a proletarian party" (Article 3), thereby reflecting the aspirations of the Congolese revolutionaries. But most of the charters of the revolutionary-democratic parties which have been adopted in recent years, and also the constitutions, characterize them as a political vanguard, as the advanced and most organized detachment of the workers, as vanguard parties of the alliance of workers and peasants, and as the highest form of the organization of the people

(Article 3 of the 1976 Charter of the People's Revolutionary Party of Benin, Article 1 of the 1977 Charter of the Mozambique Liberation Front, Article 1 of the 1979 Charter of the People's Liberation Front, and Article 4 of the 1977 Constitution of Benin). In contrast to the charter, Article 2 of the 1979 Constitution of the Congo contains the same formulation.

As the revolutionary parties develop, special norms which regulate the social composition of these parties appear in their charters. The charters of some of the parties contain a list of the social groups of the population whose representatives can be admitted into their ranks. According to Article 5 of the Charter of the People's Revolutionary Party of Benin, a worker, a poor peasant, a middle peasant, a soldier, and a representative of the civilian and military intelligentsias can become a member. A similar proposition is contained in Article 4 of the Charter of the Congolese Labor Party (only the middle peasant is not specified in the list). Article 7 of the Charter of the People's Liberation Front (with the changes of 1980) states that the party fills its ranks with workers, peasants, soldiers, and representatives of the revolutionary intelligentsia, while Article 8 contains an addition permitting the admission into the party of craftsmen and small tradesmen.

Detailed propositions about the persons who may not be admitted into the Revolutionary Party of Tanzania are contained in its 1977 Charter. According to Article 2 (Point 8), persons are not admitted into the party (or do not stay in it) who do not respect the people, who do not strive to understand, explain, defend, and employ in practice the party's policies, who do not believe that labor is a measure of man, who do not behave themselves in an exemplary manner, and so forth. It is stated here that the party admits workers and peasants and cannot admit person who participate in capitalist or feudal enterprises (who are shareholders in any company, who head a capitalist enterprise, who receive more than one wage, and who have houses intended for rental).

Under present conditions the charters of the revolutionary parties sometimes permit a substantial centralization of a number of aspects of their organization and activities. In particular, the leaders of the provincial party organizations of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola--Labor Party and the Mozambique Liberation Front were appointed by the central committees (the first secretaries of the provincial committees of the Mozambique Liberation Front were appointed in the spring of 1980 by the Permanent Political Commission of the CC).

Other methods of party direction also bear witness to centralization (for example, according to the Charter of the People's Revolutionary Party of Benin, the calling of party meetings and the list of candidates for elective offices have to be first approved by superior bodies). A certain number of delegates to the party congress are not elected, but become one of their number in accordance with the post occupied by them in the party or in the state service. Another group of representatives is delegated by public organizations which operate under the leadership of the party, and which are its component parts in the party-front. Large rights are enjoyed by the leader of the party who, according to the Charter of the Revolutionary Party of Tanzania, is the "chief ideologist"



(Article 65), directs all of the party's higher agencies, and appoints the secretaries of the oblast party organizations (the chairman of this organization is elected). In Algeria the general secretary of the People's Liberation Front, in accordance with the changes made in the charter made in 1990, first appoints the members of the politburo whom he then presents to the CC for approval.

The ideological platforms of the ruling revolutionary parties differ from one another. Today in their programs and charters many of them proclaim scientific socialism to be their ideological basis and theoretical foundation. Such propositions are contained in the programs and charters of the Congolese Labor Party, the Mozambique Liberation Front, and the Yemeni Socialist Party.

Different characterizations of their ideological basis are given by the documents of certain other ruling parties of socialist orientation countries. With the changes of 1980, the Charter of the National Liberation Front of Algeria names as its ideological basis the National Charter which was adopted by means of a referendum and which experienced a substantial influence from the ideas of scientific socialism, but also from certain conceptions of Islam. The ideological principles of the Vanguard Party of the Malagasy Revolution which is led by the President of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar, D. Ratsiraka, are contained in the Charter of the Malagasy Socialist Revolution which was also adopted by referendum. An important role in the life of society is assigned here to the fukunulun--a traditional organization of the population which is now being transformed according to new principles.

As the revolutionary-democratic parties develop, as there is an improvement in their social composition, a rise in the ideological level of the members of the party, and an improvement of methods of leadership, the principle of democratic centralism becomes stronger, intra-party democracy develops, and there is a growth in the activeness of ordinary party members and of their responsibility for the work of the party organization. All this leads to a further increase in the fighting efficiency of the party and to a strengthening of its leading role in society and the state and in the creation of the preconditions (and sometimes the foundations) for a socialist society.

A regulation on the leading role of the ruling party is not always immediately included in the party documents and constitutions of the socialist orientation countries. Such regulations did not exist and sometimes do not exist to this day in the documents of the party-fronts, party-movements, and certain national-democratic parties. However, most of the programs and constitutions now make this very important principle official.

There are sometimes various peculiarities in the understanding and interpretation by revolutionary democrats of the principle of the leading roles of the advanced party. One of them is the notion of the party as the supreme political power. Usually this is validated by the consideration that the party unites the majority or a substantial part of the adult population of a country (we are speaking about a definite group of countries), while the state is only the party's technical apparatus with a few people. As a result, the party is given broad authority,



and the prerogatives of the state are looked upon as derivatives. The state acts as an executor of the party's will, and public organizations are declared to be the collective members of the party and its component parts. Article 1 of the Charter of the Revolutionary Party of Tanzania states that it performs the leadership of all state bodies and has "supreme constitutional authority" over them (Preamble).

This approach was expressed even more clearly in the above-mentioned conception of the party-state and in the political practice of Guinea, although here it has important special characteristics.

The procedure for admission into the revolutionary parties in the socialist orientation countries is also diverse. According to the charters of most of the bodies, in order to enter their ranks it is necessary to have the recommendations of two (sometimes three) members of the party who have party seniority of no less than three years (the African Party of Independence for Guinea and Cape Verde) and who know the entrant from their joint work for no less than a year (the Yemeni Socialist Party). A candidate's probationary period which comes to from one to two years (and may be extended) has been established. A candidate's probationary period has not been provided for in the Revolutionary Party of Tanzania, but applicants study the party's policy and undergo a check on their political maturity. In 1978, a probationary period--six months--was established in the party of the Progressive Front of the People of the Seychelles Islands for those wishing to join the party's ranks. The party-state of Guinea, which includes the majority of the adult population of the country, does not establish any conditions at all of this kind.

The formulations of the rights and duties of the members of the revolutionary parties are also marked by a large amount of diversity which, it is true, has to do more with the form than with the essence of these propositions, and sometimes reflects specific national demands upon a party member (for example, respect women and lead a healthy way of life--in Mozambique, wage a resolute struggle against tribal xenophobia--in Benin, always speak the truth--in Tanzania, and so forth). On the whole, the formulations of the rights and duties in the charters of the revolutionary-democratic parties are the influence of the experience of the world communist movement. In many respects they coincide with the points which are in the charters of Marxist-Leninist parties.

The charters of a number of parties name democratic centralism as their most important organizational principle (Article 12 of the Charter of the People's Revolutionary Party of Benin, Article 10 of the Charter of the Congolese Labor Party, Article 13 of the Mozambique Liberation Movement, and others). The shift to the construction of the party according to the production-territorial characteristic (certain charters speak about territorial-production organization) signifies a new level in the development of democratic centralism. This is witnessed by the experience of Angola and Mozambique where the party cells at enterprises and institutions began to be created on a wide scale only after the adoption in 1977 of new charters which included the principle of democratic centralism. In Algeria such cells began to be organized after the adoption of

the 1979 Charter of the National Liberation Front. It has to be noted, however, that to this day in a number of countries party cells at enterprises, institutions, and in the armed forces are created experimentally and sometimes do not possess the rights of primary party organizations with the result that the effectiveness of the party's work is lowered.

However, in the vast majority of countries with a socialist orientation, the understanding of the leading role of the party does not differ essentially from how this role is understood by communists. In the relationships between the revolutionary party, especially a vanguard workers' party, and the state and the party and public organizations use is made--in conformity with the conditions of these countries and the character of the ruling parties in them--of some of the methods and forms of leadership which have been built up in the practice of the socialist countries.

First of all, the ruling revolutionary party (especially a vanguard workers' party) works out the general prospects for the activities of state agencies and public organizations (this prospect in certain countries is given special legal status in the national charters) and conducts its policy through them and through its members who work in these bodies and organizations. All fundamental questions that have to do with the entire country, an administrative-territorial unit, or a labor collective are discussed in the appropriate party organizations and decided with regard to party directives. The latter, however, are not some kind of orders. The instructions of the party are not administrative rule, but political leadership. They are realized within the framework of the constitution (the corresponding proposition is contained in Article 3 of the 1978 Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen).

Secondly, the revolutionary parties control the execution of their decisions by the members of the party who work in state bodies, public organizations, and in the economic sphere. The discussion in primary cells and party agencies of the most important issues of the work of state and public organizations, enterprises, institutions, construction projects, and so forth makes it possible to increase the efficiency of this work, and to eliminate the errors and shortcomings of the party members who are workers in these organizations and bodies. As a result of the discussions, decisions and recommendations are made on improving work. Practical and competent assistance is also one of the forms of party leadership.

Thirdly, the revolutionary workers' parties promote and recommend capable people who are devoted to the cause, above all from among the workers, to leading state, public, and economic posts. In a number of countries, in accordance with the law, only party members may occupy leading state posts. In certain countries non-party members are also advanced to this kind of work.

Fourthly, the revolutionary-democratic parties show concern for a constant growth of the ideological level of workers and organize their political studies and education. They carry out their leading role in fact, although in a number of countries they do not do so fully and frequently they do so with substantial

peculiarities which will be examined below. These parties have become the initiators of the elimination of the old and the creation of a new state apparatus, and under their leadership fundamental socio-economic transformations are carried out and an enormous amount of work is performed to overcome the backwardness and ignorance inherited from colonialism and to develop the country's economy. They have led political educational work among the population and are waging a struggle against tribalism and for the introduction of new forms of everyday life.

As has already been noted, in a number of countries there are definite special characteristics in the relationships between the revolutionary party and the state, public organizations, and labor collectives. They are characteristic to the greatest extent of those countries which have the principle of the supremacy of the party, the conception of a party-state, or where the party-movement or party-front continued to be preserved. Under these conditions, not only the state but also public organizations are sometimes regarded as integral parts of the party. In accordance with Article 12 of the Charter of the Front, on the Seychelles Islands trade unions contribute to its fund 25% of the total amount of the contributions made by trade union members. According to the Charter of the Revolutionary Party of Tanzania, the charters of mass organizations have to be "approved beforehand" by the National Executive Committee of the Party (Article 70), and the basic officials of mass organizations on the oblast and district levels are appointed by the chairman or CC of the party and have the status of party secretaries.

Although in the party documents, charters, and constitutions it is sometimes emphasized that the party and state act separately, making use of different methods in order to achieve common goals, and that their authorities must not intersect and coincide (Article 101 of the 1976 Constitution of Algeria), in fact the opposite frequently occurs. Because of the special role which is played in the countries being considered by the president of the republic, certain charters and constitutions provide for the mandatory combination of the posts of chairman of the ruling party and the president, giving priority to party election. After being elected at a party congress or at a meeting of its CC, the party leader becomes, by virtue of this, the head of state (Angola, Benin, the Congo, and others).

In practice, the CC of the parties repeatedly created supreme agencies of state power (in Angola and Mozambique--revolutionary councils). But the supreme agencies of state power also frequently created the central agencies of the party, gradually forming it (in Benin and Burma), issued documents of party significance, carried out the reorganization of various public associations of workers, and created and dissolved them; the presidents made personnel changes in the leading party's agencies.

The relationships between the revolutionary workers' party and public organizations also acquire a special character in those cases when other parties and a public political association--a national front--exist legally in a country (Madagascar). Article 9 of the Constitution of Madagascar states that the National Front for the Protection of the Revolution (at the present time it consists of



six parties) inspires the revolution, directs it in its movement toward socialism, and inspires the activities of the state. The constitution does not contain any points about the leading role of any party, although in practice a dominant role in the political system belongs to the Vanguard Party of the Malagasy Revolution which is led by the president. In contrast to Madagascar, where the National Front is regarded not only as a specific alliance of classes and social strata of the population, but also as a public political association, in certain other countries it is characterized as a broad mass movement which operates under the leadership of the revolutionary party. In Article 31 of the Charter of the People's Revolutionary Party of Benin it is stated that the party has to be closely connected with the masses through the organizations which are led by it, thereby forming a broad national front of all of the oppressed and exploited strata and classes. In this case, consultative national conferences are the organizational expression of the front (Benin, Congo).

In accordance with Article 41 of the Charter of the Congolese Labor Party, these conferences may be participated in by members of the party and of the council of ministers, deputies to the National People's Meeting, representatives of agencies of popular power, delegates from mass public organizations, leading workers from various branches of the economy, and the representatives of religious organizations.

Although such conferences are called very rarely, they are called.

Thus, the process of the construction of a vanguard revolutionary workers' party is very long and complex. It possesses unique features in practically every one of the countries with a socialist orientation. The vanguard workers' parties themselves also have their special characteristics, sometimes quite significant ones. Even in countries which are close in their level of development, culture, and so forth, there are such differences (let us compare, for example, the Mozambique Liberation Front and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Labor Party). At the present time it is possible to outline only the most general characteristics of the vanguard revolutionary-democratic workers' party. In our view, this is a political organization of the vanguard of the working strata of the population which recognizes Marxism-Leninism as its ideological basis and the construction of socialism as its program. It makes use of the experience of the communist parties and performs work to educate its members, preparing them for a change-over to the ideological positions of the most progressive force of society--the working class.

The revolutionary parties of the socialist orientation countries maintain close contacts with the world Communist movement and with the CPSU. These contacts promote an exchange of experience and an improvement of the work methods of the revolutionary parties.



#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Socialist Orientation States," Moscow, "Nauka," 1975; A. V. Kiva, "Socialist Orientation Countries. Basic Development Tendencies," Moscow, "Nauka," 1978; Yu. N. Gavrilov, "Problems of the Formation of a Vanguard Party in Socialist Orientation Countries," NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, No 6, 1980; N. D. Kosukhin, "The Formation of Ideological and Political Strategy in African Socialist Orientation Countries," Moscow, "Nauka," 1980; "The Ideology of African Revolutionary Democrats," Moscow, "Nauka," 1981; and others.
2. Yu. Tsedenbal, "Illuminated by Theory, Tested by Practice. Experience in the Construction of a Leninist Type Party in Mongolia," PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, No 3, 1981.
3. R. Ul'yanovskiy, "On the Socialist Orientation Countries," KOMMUNIST, No 11, 1979, p 117.

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## ANTI-SOVIET BASIS OF SINO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE EXPOSED

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian, No 8, August 1981, pp 16-19.

[Article by V. Kulikov: "Peking and Tokyo: A Dangerous Rapprochement"]

[Text] The development of Sino-Japanese relations in the second half of the 1970s, and especially after the signing by Peking and Tokyo of a treaty "on peace and friendship" in 1978, is taking on an increasingly dangerous character, and is becoming one of the serious destabilizing factors in international relations in the Far East. This is connected above all with a strengthening of anti-Soviet, anti-socialist, and militarist tendencies which in recent times have been defining the direction and tempos of the Sino-Japanese rapprochement.

### Factors in the Rapprochement

In the report by the General Secretary of the CC CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, at the XXVI CPSU Congress it is emphasized that, despite changes which are occurring in the domestic policies of China, "unfortunately, one is still not able to speak about any kinds of changes for the better in Peking's foreign policy. As before, it is aimed at an exacerbation of the international situation and it joins up with the policies of imperialism." In Japan's foreign policy, it is stated in the report, "negative moments are being strengthened—playing along with the dangerous plans of Washington and Peking, and a tendency toward militarization."

For China's part, the rapprochement with Japan has been determined by a large number of factors.

In particular, during the second half of the 1970s, especially after the change of leadership in China, the anti-Sovietism of its foreign policy became stronger, which found a confirmation both in the documents of the XI Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, the plenums of the CC of the Chinese Communist Party, and the sessions of the All-Chinese Meeting of People's Representatives and in the practical activities of Peking on the international arena. Policy in relation to Japan was regarded as a means of achieving specific anti-Soviet goals. Peking made substantial efforts, (including with the intention of worsening Japanese-Soviet relations), offering itself to Tokyo as a profitable partner in the economic area.

During the same period, there was a sharp activization of attempts by the Chinese leaders to realize their foreign policy goals by exploiting "parallel interests" with imperialism in Asia and in the entire world. It is important to note that with the help of "parallel" anti-Soviet actions with the United States and its allies Peking hopes to bring about the realization of its hegemonistic designs. The aggression against socialist Vietnam which was carried out in 1979 graphically demonstrated Peking's true goals.

Substantial influence on the development of Sino-Japanese relations during the second half of the 1970s was exercised by Peking's endeavour to make them a pivot for the creation of a single anti-Soviet front in Asia and one of its essential elements on a world scale.

A sufficiently high level of bilateral relations might also serve, in Peking's opinion, as an important precondition for the successful realization of Chinese policy in Southeast Asia, and in Indo-China in particular. The interests of both sides in this region coincide in their opposition to the forces of socialism, progress, and of the national liberation movement.

Finally, the Chinese leadership which came to power after Mao Zedong's death proclaimed the task of transforming the country by the end of the present century into a militarily and economically powerful world power. The accomplishment of these tasks is seen by the pragmatic Chinese leaders through the development of contacts with the United States, the Western European countries, and Japan, and, moreover, the latter is assigned an especial role in China's obtaining modern equipment and industrial technology.

The development of Sino-Japanese relations in the above area has proven to a substantial extent to be "tied" to the realization of China's economic development program under the slogans of "four modernizations."

In its turn, Japan's policies with respect to the Chinese People's Republic also took shape under the influence of various factors.

In particular, an important influence on this process was exercised by the considerable dependence of Tokyo's foreign policy upon Washington. The American-Chinese rapprochement stimulated the development of Japanese-Chinese contacts in all directions, especially in the military and political fields. It is appropriate to note here that this dependence made it easier for the Chinese side to achieve its goals in its relations with Japan, strengthen their anti-Soviet resonance, and made them a component part of the system of military and political cooperation between Peking and imperialism in Asia.

The strengthening of militaristic tendencies in the policies of Tokyo and of the circles which support them, and also the emphasis by the Chinese side of the anti-Soviet thrusts of the rapprochement between Peking and Tokyo greatly increased the interest of the strengthened military-industrial complex of Japan and of its right-wing forces in cooperation with China on this basis. The "General Program of National Defense" which was adopted in October 1976 and in accordance with

which since 1977 Japan has been undergoing militarization takes account of the direction of Soviet-Chinese relations as one of the determining realities of the international situation in the Far East. According to the Hong Kong periodical FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, in the financial year which began in April 1981 Japan's appropriations for military needs will come to 9.7% more than in the 1980 fiscal year. Peking's leaders are putting crude pressure on Tokyo, offering Japan to more than double the expenditures for these purposes and thereby supporting the supporters in the country of the accelerated militarization of Japan.

Of very great importance for the development of Japanese-Chinese relations is the endeavour by broad Japanese business circles to obtain access to the Chinese markets, an interest in which is being artificially stirred up by Peking, and also the possibility of making up for the absence of raw material and energy resources on the basis of the development of the corresponding branches of the Chinese economy and of purchasing their output.

Tokyo's endeavour not to lag behind the United States in its rapprochement with China and not to lose a potentially very important trade partner also played a role.

Apparently, definite hopes also exist in Tokyo that the relations with China would promote a strengthening of Japan's positions both on the regional level and on the world arena. This circumstance is very important if one takes account of the position of the ruling circles of Japan which are emphasizing the lack of correspondence between the country's economic might and its political influence.

The existence of "parallel interests" between Peking and Tokyo in Southeast Asia which consist in opposing an expansion of the positions of socialism and of the national liberation movement make China an especially important partner for Japan since an agreement with it on a division of spheres of influence can serve as a special condition for the success of Japan's economic expansion.

Note should also be taken of the fact that the development of Sino-Japanese relations is not hindering Tokyo from maintaining stable relations with Taiwan in the economic field. For example, according to the data of the foreign press, in 1979 Japanese capital investments in the economy of the island increased by 54% compared to the previous year and came to 328.8 million American dollars.

The enormous funds which have been invested by the leading Japanese companies in China's economy have given rise to a fear of losing the profits from them. And as a result of the sharp curtailment in the Chinese People's Republic of modernization plans basically through the stopping of capital construction it is possible that the fate of these very investments will impel the Japanese government to carry out a more active policy with respect to China.

These are the leading factors which promoted the Japanese-Chinese rapprochement in the second half of the 1970s and, especially, after 1978.



Counting upon extracting an advantage from this process, the Peking leaders have actively supported it.

However, there are forces in the leadership of the Chinese People's Republic which favor a slowing down of the rates of economic cooperation with capitalism, seeing in it a threat for the independence of China, and which are fighting for a return to the slogan of "support by our own forces."

It is appropriate to note that the differences on this question in the Chinese leadership are connected with the different approaches of the chief opposing groupings in present-day China to broader problems of its further development. Consequently, the process of rapprochement with Japan will also depend to a considerable degree upon the concrete disposition of forces in the ruling circles of the Chinese People's Republic. At the same time, these differences are explained to a large extent by the purely tactical considerations of the neo-Maoists of different persuasions who are struggling for power.

In Japan, the supporters of the development of contacts with China are made up most of all of broad business circles under the pressure of which Tokyo took the decision on the normalization of relations with the Chinese People's Republic. Their interest in the successful organization of bilateral relations, and sometimes their dependence upon the successful development of relations with China which is skillfully used by Peking, including for attempts to worsen Japanese-Soviet relations, are one of the most important reasons for the stable endeavour by Tokyo to develop relations with the Chinese People's Republic on a long-term basis. The strengthened military-industrial circles of Japan and its right-wing forces actively support Japanese-Chinese rapprochement, making use of anti-Soviet slogans which are at its basis as a means of propagandizing public opinion within the country in favor of its militarization.

During the second half of the 1970s a specific inter-party agreement developed in Japan with regard to Tokyo's policy in relation to Peking. Of all the leading political parties of the country, practically only the Communist Party of Japan stands in opposition to this process in its existing form since it correctly sees in it a real danger of the rebirth of Japanese militarism and of a repetition of the tragic consequences caused by it for Japan, for all Asiatic countries, and for peace and detente. Such unity of the political and business forces of Japan with regard to relations with China and also the support for these plans by the Japanese government ensured the Japanese side relatively rapid rates of development for the bilateral relations. And these rates are being preserved to the present time.

#### On an Anti-Soviet Basis

The Japanese-Chinese rapprochement in the second half of the 1970s developed against the background of important changes in the global disposition of forces on the international arena and in Asia which exercised an important influence on the process being considered.

The awareness by the ruling circles of the United States of the necessity for maintaining nuclear parity with the Soviet Union which to a large extent determined the development of the tendencies of detente began to be replaced by attempts to restore lost positions on the world arena and by preparations for a counter-offensive by imperialism against the gains of the socialist commonwealth and of the national liberation movement. Under these conditions a role was played by the illusions of a certain sector of the ruling circles of the United States that military and political cooperation with China on an anti-Soviet basis and the playing of the so-called "China card" against the countries of the socialist commonwealth and the liberated states would help to turn back the course of history and would help the realization of Washington's global plans.

As the military and political ally of the United States, Japan also undertook steps in the direction of rapprochement with the Chinese People's Republic. A considerable weakening of the positions of American imperialism in Asia as a result of the victory of the peoples of Indo-China in 1975 stimulated a re-evaluation of the basic directions of the United States' "Asian doctrine." Under these international conditions, an especial role was played by the anti-Soviet policy of the new Chinese leaders which was oriented toward opposing the growth of the influence of socialism. It found its expression in support for an American military presence in the region and, in particular, for a Japanese-American "security treaty." This circumstance was of enormous importance for the development of Japanese-Chinese relations on an anti-Soviet basis.

It was strengthened by the endeavour of the new pragmatic leaders of China to speed up the development of these relations in the interest of a modernization of the Chinese economy.

The anti-Soviet platform of rapprochement was clearly expressed in the "peace and friendship" treaty between Japan and China the negotiations for which had begun as early as 1975.

As is known, the negotiations process which preceded the signing of this document dragged on for three years. The basic issue in dispute was the point concerning "opposition to the hegemony" of a third power in Asia into which the Chinese side was putting an anti-Soviet meaning. The inclusion of it in the text of the official treaty (such a formulation already existed in a number of joint Japanese-Chinese documents) had far-ranging consequences for Tokyo. This was an alternative to the traditional maneuvering by Japanese diplomacy between the USSR and China. The evolution of the Japanese position from resistance to the acceptance of this formulation to actual support for it with certain reservations reflected a change in Japan's foreign policy as a whole and a strengthening of its anti-Soviet resonance.

For China, whose policy was characterized by an escalation of anti-Sovietism, this choice was made earlier, when the new Chinese leaders left without reply the well-known peace initiatives of the Soviet government. Active efforts to create a single international front of struggle against the USSR provided for the involvement in it of Japan also.

The ambitious program of "four modernizations" which was declared in China greatly exaggerated the country's capabilities in the purchasing and assimilation of foreign industrial equipment and technology. It was also used to convince its Western and Japanese partners of the advantages of trade with the Chinese People's Republic and to "tie" them to the Chinese market and make them more pliable toward an anti-Soviet policy.

The position of the United States was a very important circumstance for the conclusion of the treaty and for the process of Japanese-Chinese rapprochement as a whole. In Washington, the Japanese-Chinese relations were regarded above all as a gate on the road of a hypothetical Chinese-Soviet rapprochement or an improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations.

The Carter Administration played a large role in the last stage of the work which preceded the signing of the treaty. A strengthening of the militarist tendencies and aggressive character of United States foreign policy placed in the forefront for Washington the task of achieving "superiority" over the Soviet Union in the military and political fields. The regrouping of the forces of imperialism which was carried out for these purposes for a global counter-offensive against the positions of socialism and of the peace-loving forces presupposed an even more active use of the "Chinese factor" in imperialist policies.

The well-known statement of the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sonoda, in July 1979, testified to Tokyo's endeavour to make China a country economically dependent upon capitalism and thereby to reinforce the anti-Soviet course of the Peking leadership which is advantageous to imperialism. The establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Chinese People's Republic was announced and economic relations between the NATO countries and China developed actively. It is only in this international context that one can consider the conclusion of the treaty on "peace and friendship" between Japan and China and the inclusion in it of the point on "resistance to hegemony." These actions became important stages on the way toward the formation of "parallel interests" between Peking and imperialism both in Asia and on the international arena.

All of this led to the emergence at the end of the 1970s of a new international situation in Asia which is characterized, first of all, by the global counter-offensive of the forces of imperialism and reaction in coalition with the Peking hegemonist--anti-Sovietists. At the same time, the so-called "Chinese factor" played an essential role not only in preparing and carrying out the above process, but also in giving it an even more aggressive character, which showed itself especially clearly during the brigand-like attack by China on socialist Vietnam. This aggression became one of the culminating moments of the above-mentioned counter-offensive and of the process of rapprochement between Maoist China and imperialism.

Peking's anti-Vietnamese action laid bare the essence of the Chinese-Japanese agreement. The vague position of official Japanese circles who found themselves captive to their own commitments regarding "opposition to hegemony" was not only a factual approval of China's crude aggression, but also clearly demonstrated the



character of this conspiracy which was dangerous for the countries of Southeast Asia. In the vast majority of states in the region, Tokyo's position gave rise to great concern.

Thus, the development of Japanese-Chinese relations during the second half of the 1970s became a part of the wider process of the rapprochement between China and imperialist centers and it reflects the direction of the "parallel interests" of Tokyo and Peking which is dangerous for peace and security in Asia.

#### The Contradictions Remain

The process of Japanese-Chinese rapprochement is not simple and is contradictory, which is confirmed by the numerous disagreements and difficulties in Japanese-Chinese political and economic relations. In the bilateral relations and outside of them there are long-term factors which hinder their development and also factors which have a short-term character and which arise in connection with concrete problems of the Japanese-Chinese rapprochement.

One should not discount, for example, the discrepancy between the purposes of the foreign policy doctrines of both countries which consist in plans for the achievement by each of them of their own dominion in Asia. Both sides regard an increase in their military and economic potentials as a means of realizing this goal. This circumstance, in the opinion of a number of observers, cannot but lead to an exacerbation of the conflict between China and Japan on a regional level.

It also seems that the increase in Japan's military might which is leading to a return to the old militarist slogans of creating a "co-prosperity sphere" in the Asian Pacific Ocean region is also capable of reviving the old attitude toward the place of China and the other Asian countries in this community which amounts to the role of an object of Japanese expansion.

In their turn, the economic contradictions and difficulties also have a long-term character. Incidentally, they are already manifesting themselves sufficiently sharply and are having an important influence on the state of current Japanese-Chinese relations.

The groundlessness of the plans for modernization of the Chinese economy have already at this stage led to a rejection of a substantial number of Japanese contracts for the construction of industrial objects in China. The losses of the Japanese side are estimated at 1.5 billion dollars. As is known, Peking made the decision to temporarily halt, postpone, or stop the fulfillment of many of the 120 "most important projects" and to begin a period of "regulating the economy."

The rejection by the Chinese People's Republic of its ambitious program of "four modernizations" whose total cost was estimated in the West as 600 billion dollars, and the shift to the development of the economy by means of improving light industry and partially satisfying the top-priority needs of the Chinese people which has led to a worsening of Japanese-Chinese relations are substan-



tially narrowing the prospects for cooperation between Japan and China in the branches of the Chinese People's Republic's heavy industry.

Chinese petroleum which both sides saw as a means of paying for Japanese credits and as an important source of Chinese exports to Japan has proven to be not only of low quality, but also, as a result of the backwardness of the Chinese economy, it cannot be extracted in sufficient quantities.

It should be noted that although the above-mentioned problems have seriously shaken the positions of the "Chinese lobby" in Japan, they have not yet led to a rejection by Japanese companies of trade contacts with China. During the next several years it will be given definite financial aid which will lead, in the opinion of Japanese business circles, to a partial compensation in the future for their substantial losses.

Japanese-Chinese contradictions in the economic field on Asian markets, especially in Southeast Asia, are beginning to be exacerbated. Today they are expressed in individual clashes, but with time they may acquire great sharpness and a political coloring.

Thus, the economic aspects of Japanese-Chinese relations already have or conceal within themselves contradictions which are capable, in the opinion of observers, of leading to a weakening of the mutual interest in their further development or to a shift to a lower level in the system of the foreign trade priorities of Peking and Tokyo.

The question of the future of Taiwan belongs to the category of "bones of contention" in Japanese-Chinese relations. So far Peking and Tokyo have succeeded in bypassing this problem, since the Chinese People's Republic regards the prospects for its solution in the context of relations with the United States. But Japanese interests in Taiwan, as was stated above, are substantial. They are determined not only by the Japanese capital which has been invested in the economy of the island, but also by its geographical position on the path of Japanese imports from other countries. From the point of view of Tokyo, the reunification of Taiwan with China could, with a worsening of Japanese-Chinese relations, lead to its use by Peking for anti-Japanese purposes. At one time the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ohira, openly stated that Japan has in fact not recognized Taiwan as Chinese territory.

Although they have been somewhat muffled by the announced "parallel interests," the territorial disputes regarding the ownership of certain islands and part of the continental shelf after the discovery there of petroleum deposits have not completely lost their acuteness. This was demonstrated very clearly in 1978 by the events surrounding the Senkaku Islands whose ownership is being disputed by China, Japan, and Taiwan.

Nor must there be an underestimation of the possibility of a discrepancy between the positions of the two sides on concrete questions of the development of the international situation in Asia. For example, the Sino-Japanese ministerial

conference in Peking which took place in December 1980 recorded in its communique the different approaches of these two states to the initiative of the ASEAN member countries on settling the "Cambodian question."

The process of Japanese-Chinese rapprochement which is, on the one hand, a part of the general counter-offensive by imperialist forces against the positions of socialism and of the national liberation movement and, on the other, one of the elements in Peking's general policy of joining up with imperialism, has taken on, especially after the signing of the "peace and friendship" treaty, an openly anti-Soviet and anti-socialist character.

Under these conditions, of paramount importance are the Soviet peace initiatives which were advanced by the 26th CPSU Congress and are aimed at strengthening detente, weakening the danger of war, and bridling the arms race. In particular, the concrete negotiations being suggested on measures of trust in the Far East with all interested countries would not only promote a lowering of the general level of tension in the region, but also the cause of peace in the entire world.

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## CRITIQUE OF LEFT RADICALISM IN LATIN AMERICA

Moscow RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENYY MIR in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 81 pp 152-7

[Article by L. S. Poskonin: "Latin American Left-Wing Radicalism: The Search for a Revolutionary Alternative"]

[Excerpts] The task of summing up new phenomena of social processes, which was assigned by the 26th CPSU Congress, requires an analysis of the ideological struggle -- which is becoming sharper in Latin America -- around revolutionary and reformist alternatives. The question concerns the development paths of the Latin American countries. The advocates of the revolutionary alternative have intensified the struggle to orient the liberation movement on the development of anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchical processes from a socialist perspective. The reformist forces have assigned as their goal the modernization of Latin American capitalism, the bringing of it closer to the GMR [state monopoly capitalism] model, and the making of mechanisms -- which would ensure the defense of the exploiter system under the conditions of the sharpening class struggle -- more effective.

A radical left-wing current, which is the influential direction in Latin American social and political thought, has taken shape amidst the sharpening of the ideological struggle around the prospects for the continent's further development and the Cuban revolution's growing influence in Latin America.

The formation of the views of the left-wing radicals took place under the influence of the ideas of scientific socialism which is exerting an ever growing influence on the ideological struggle in Latin America.

The left-wing radical concepts have been brought forward amidst the crisis of bourgeois "economic growth" theories -- both neo-Keynesian and neo-classical ones. These theories have not been able to give any effective recommendations for economic policy under the conditions of the instability and crisis of the world capitalist economic structure and the intensification of inflation and social and political shocks. These were the theories of a narrowly interpreted development process and not of the elimination of imperialist exploitation.

The left-wing radicals have come forward with a thorough criticism of Latin America's relationship of dependence on imperialism. They have underscored imperialism's desire to strengthen its supremacy on the continent and the processes which are polarizing wealth and poverty, concentrating power in the hands of the

oligarchy and strengthening the ties of local big capital with the multinational corporations (MNC). Responsibility for Latin America's backwardness is being placed on the developed capitalist countries. At the same time, the left-wing radicals' approach to the analysis of the basic trends in the continent's social, economic and political development is noted for non-dialectics and one-sidedness. This is caused by the fact that structuralism is the methodological basis of left-wing radical concepts.

Based on the structuralist methodology, the Latin American left-wing radicals, who have analyzed individual aspects of the functioning of Latin American capitalism and the mechanisms for the imperialist exploitation of the Latin American countries and subjected them to sharp criticism, nevertheless disregard the analysis of internal aspects in the development of Latin American capitalism when examining the problems of dependence. They do not consider the contradictions between the local bourgeoisie and imperialism and the yearning of the Latin American countries to weaken the dependence on the United States. Having shown that the dependence is intertwined in the very fabric of Latin American capitalism, the left-wing radicals at the same time do not see the internal bases for the dependence which are rooted in the development of this capitalism. Thus, the left-wing radicals boil the causes of the deep structural crisis down only to the relationships of outward dependence, ignoring the coming of age of the internal contradictions and underestimating the sharpness of the class antagonisms. The structuralist approach of the left-wing radical sociologists and their non-acceptance of the basic ideas of Marxism-Leninism have predetermined to a considerable degree the discrepancy in their evaluations of the prospects for the Latin American countries' development.

The vagueness in the determination of the major features and the social, economic and political characteristics of the new society and the lack of clarity in the alternative -- put forward by the left-wing radicals -- for the continent's social development and of their positive ideal are linked both with the non-acceptance of the ideas of scientific socialism and with the non-synonymous attitude of the left-wing radicals towards the motive forces of the revolutionary processes in Latin America, especially toward the working class. Recognizing the importance of the working class as an important political force, Cardoso and Furtado nevertheless considered it "integrated" in bourgeois society and deny its revolutionary character, giving priority to the middle class and the peasants. Dos Santos emphasizes the leading role of the working class in the struggle for socialism; but, by orienting it on "an immediate socialist revolution", he essentially cancels out the inexhaustible anti-imperialist potential of broad layers of the population. This means that the proletariat is deprived of allies. At the same time, it is necessary to emphasize that the world outlook of the left-wing radicals is not static; it is undergoing an evolution. Thus, deep attention toward the problems of the worker movement on the continent, which is characteristic of a number of sociologists who have paid tribute to left-wing radicalism but who are now more and more clearly being drawn to Marxism, is a significant fact. Thus, the Mexican sociologist and economist A. Aguilar, in examining the different aspects of the worker's movement in Mexico, points out that the winning of political power by the proletariat and the socialist revolution are not possible without a proletarian party, without the support of the popular masses,



and without developing a clear strategy and tactics.<sup>1</sup> A. Cordova (Mexico) points out the need to develop an independent policy for the working class and to decisively dissassociate oneself from "sectarian ultra-left-wing groupings."<sup>2</sup> However, an analysis of the political and logical views of the left-wing radicals on the whole shows that their evaluations of the role of the working class and its allies in the liberation struggle, especially in its further radicalization, and their dealing with the question of political alliances have been noted for contradictions.

The lack of clarity in the positive ideal of the left-wing radicals is also linked with their non-acceptance of real socialism.

On the one hand, it is possible to encounter in the works of the left-wing radical sociologists positive evaluations of the world socialist system and the accomplishments of the USSR. However, at the same time these positive evaluations of the left-wing radicals pertain only to individual aspects of the socialist system. Moreover, socialism itself is an extremely abstract notion in their conceptions; it is basically "socialism in general", socialism as some remote and unclear prospect. Concerning the real socialism created in the USSR and in a number of other countries in the socialist commonwealth, left-wing radicals essentially reject it.

The left-wing radicals do not have a deep understanding of the democratic nature of real socialism, reprint falsehoods about the "dominance of techno-bureaucratic elites", and regard "central control over decisions" and "centralized planning" negatively. They reproduce under modern conditions Proudhonist notions about socialism as a society of self-governing communes and picture centralism as something foreign to socialism, "as something only from above, only capable of being imposed and preserved by officials and militarists."<sup>3</sup> They do not see the importance of democratic centralism and planning under the conditions of worker power. "Centralism, understood in the truly democratic sense, assumes the opportunity -- which has been created for the first time in history -- for a full and unhindered development not only of local peculiarities but also of local initiatives, local undertakings, and a variety of ways, methods and resources for moving toward the common goal."<sup>5</sup>

Left-wing radicals also distort the nature of the socialist commonwealth, declaring that "antagonistic contradictions" and "social inequalities" exist in relations not only between imperialist countries but also between socialist countries. Dos Santos tries to accuse the USSR of "imposing old models of socialist development" and declares the need for "profound internal changes" in the socialist countries. This in fact means a rejection of socialism.<sup>6</sup>

In ignoring the fundamental differences between capitalist and socialist countries, the left-wing radicals examine them as a single group of "industrial societies." Dos Santos combines the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and the USSR into the group of "developed societies" which is opposed to "poorly developed" "dependent" countries. Furtado merges capitalist and socialist countries based on the principle of "industrially developed." He considers the contradiction between

"poor" and "rich" countries to be the main contradiction of the present epoch. He declares that not only capitalist but also socialist countries are exercising control over equipment and technology and that they are developing by exploiting the cheap labor of the oppressed and poorly developed countries. The left-wing radicals share the thesis about the opposition between the "rich North and the poor South" and the Macist concept of "two superpowers", adapting it to the conditions of Latin America.

The left-wing radical sociologists' approach to the prospects for the development of international relations is closely linked to the problem of the comparative rating of the capitalist and socialist "development models." They advance from the position of the "two-superpower" notion; they put the centers of world imperialism -- the United States, Western Europe, Japan and also China -- on the same level as the USSR. They consider the strengthening of the influence of the "hegemonistic centers" -- under which are meant the United States, Western Europe, the USSR, China, and Japan -- to be the main trend in world development. They write: "The superpowers" -- the USSR, the United States and China -- have divided the world into spheres of 'economic dominance'. It only remains for the poorly developed countries to maneuver between the countries of the "center". The "two centers of military power" -- the USSR and the United States, the "Russian-American opposition" -- are determining the future of the Latin American people. Furtado declares that the USSR is spreading its influence in Europe at the same time that the countries of the "Third World" are completely dependent on the United States. Dos Santos supports him, considering that -- after the reactionary 1973 coup in Chile -- Latin America (with the exception of Cuba) was completely transformed into a "field of activity" for the United States, and the USSR -- "not wishing to crowd the United States" in its "sphere of influence" -- is refusing to develop trade and economic relations with the Latin American countries.

Dos Santos rejects the very important Leninist proposition, in accordance with which the socialist countries are influencing the world revolutionary process primarily by their achievements in economic and social development.

The leaders of the communist parties in the Latin American countries are especially emphasizing this close intercommunication.

Left-wing radicals do not understand the fact that the revolutionary processes and the struggle for peaceful coexistence do not only not exclude each other, but -- on the contrary -- are dialectically interconnected; and that the stubborn struggle of world socialism and of the international worker movement is creating favorable conditions for the further consolidation of the socialist system, the development of revolutionary processes and the success of the socialist countries' struggle to ensure the independence and freedom of social choice for each country.

Thus, the consideration of the experiences of real socialism has exceptionally important significance for the development of a truly revolutionary alternative. By not accepting real socialism, the left-wing radicals are finding themselves in a peculiar ideological blind alley. The non-class approach to the analysis of Latin American reality; the underestimation of those social forces which are capable of carrying out a truly social upheaval, especially the working class which has been declared "integrated into the capitalist system" by the left-wing radicals;

and the non-acceptance of real socialism -- all this causes the diffusion, contradiction and -- in the final analysis -- the utopianism of their positive ideas.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. A. Aguilar, "Exigencias de un programa revolucionario". ESTRATEGIA (Mexico), No 16, 1977, pp 33-35, 39, 55.
2. A. Cordova, "La politica de masas y el futuro de la izquierda en Mexico", CUADERNOS POLITICOS (Mexico), No 19, 1979, p 49.
3. F.H. Cardoso, "O modelo politico brasileiro e outros ensaios", Rio de Janeiro-Sao Paulo, 1977, p 23, 56; T. Dos Santos, "Imperialismo y empresas multinacionales," Buenos Aires, 1973, pp 42-43; C. Furtado, Dialectica do desenvolvimento na America latina," Rio de Janeiro, 1964, pp 51-52; and C. Furtado, "Umprojeto para o Brazil," pp 52, 80.
4. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye Sobraniye Sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 33, pp 53-54.
5. Ibid., Vol 36, p 152.
6. Dos Santos, "Dependencia economica y cambio revolucionario en america latina," Carracas, 1970, p 48; Dos Santos, "Imperialismo y dependencia," Mexico, p 285; and Cardoso, "O modelo...", p 107.
7. Furtado, "Um projeto para o Brazil," pp 97, 110; Furtado, Subdesenvolvimento e estagnacao na america latina," Rio de Janeiro, 1968, pp 22, 26-34, and 49; and Dos Santos, "Imperialismo y dependencia," p 22.
8. Dos Santos, "Imperialismo y dependencia," p 404.

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US-PRC POLICIES THREATEN PEACE IN INDIAN OCEAN, PERSIAN GULF

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 6, Jun 81 pp 8-11

[Article by A. Gorban': "A Threat to Peace and Security"]

[Text/ /The new and important proposals which were advanced at the 26th CPSU Congress were directed in particular at ensuring a lasting peace in the region of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean as a whole. Proceeding in this same direction were the proposals relating to the Persian Gulf which L. I. Brezhnev made during the course of his meeting with deputies of the Indian Parliament./ /in boldface/

The persistent attention which the Soviet initiatives have brought about in the world are far from accidental. As is well known, the ruling circles of the United States are continuing their truly feverish activity in order to prevent the implementation of the UN Declaration adopted as far back as 10 years ago on converting the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. On the contrary, it is making every effort to turn this region into a staging area for war.

It is obvious that the military presence of the United States in the Indian Ocean Basin pursues the goal of ensuring control over this region, one of the most extensive and densely populated on Earth. There are approximately a billion people living on the territory of four-tenths of the states located here. This region possesses more than half of the known reserves of petroleum (hence the tendency to pass off the interests of the oil monopolies as the national interests of the United States), as well as two-thirds of the uranium, half of the gold, and almost half of the diamonds in the capitalist world; it is also the principal producer of tin, rubber, and tea.... The Indian Ocean routes account for about 10% of the world's cargo turnover. American investments in this ocean zone amount to more than 10 billion dollars.

On the other hand, the militaristic preparations of the United States correspond fully to the concept which has been developed in the Pentagon of the given region's increased military-strategic importance, linked with the placement of strategic forces from naval bases relatively close to the borders of the USSR, as well as the possibility of controlling the situation in the coastal countries with the aid of the notorious "gunboat diplomacy."



Thus, it is nothing else but the interests of monopolistic capital and the members of the militaristic-political circles which constitute the main moving spring of American policy in this region of the world.

But what will this bring to the countries of the region? In order to secure the above-mentioned "vital interests," Washington is now carrying out a broad range of practical actions, aimed primarily at the possibility for utilizing military force. This is a matter, above all, of building military bases here, of drawing the coastal states into various kinds of military-political groupings by means of rendering economic and military "aid" to them, of measures to create in the Indian Ocean a fleet which would be active on a permanent footing.

The intensity of such activities increased significantly at the end of the 1970's, in particular, after the fall of the Shah's regime in Iran and in connection with the revolutionary changes in Afghanistan. Thus, just from June through September 1980 the United States obtained official permission from the governments of Oman, Kenya, and Somali to create American Naval and Air Force bases on the territories of the above-mentioned states.

Of particular importance for the plans to subject the Indian Ocean to military-political control is the naval base on the island of Diego Garcia, which has now been transformed into a multi-purpose strongpoint, capable of supporting the actions of strategic aircraft, of harboring aircraft carriers as well as submarines with nuclear weapons on board. The Pentagon is planning to spend more than 300 million dollars on modernizing this base.

The existing and expanding network of imperialist military bases in the region, also including bases in Simonstown (Republic of South Africa), on the island of Gan [?/] (Maldives), and a number of others, is regarded within imperialist circles as an important and necessary element for carrying out a permanent military presence in the Indian Ocean zone for the purpose of exerting an influence on the political situation within the Indian Ocean countries, as well as securing the economic and military-strategic interests of the Western countries.

The imperialists are making efforts to knock together a military-political alliance consisting of the reactionary, monarchistic regimes in the Persian Gulf region along with Egypt and Israel.

Work is proceeding at full speed on the formation of "rapid-deployment forces"--diversionary-interventionist units which are supposed to be utilized for carrying out the aggressive intentions of the Pentagon and NATO. Preparations are going forward to create a Fifth American Fleet, which is supposed to permanently patrol the Indian Ocean.

But wherein in the West, and primarily in the United States, do they see a threat to their own political and economic positions, under the pretext of which a policy of military blackmail is being carried out in the Indian Ocean? Above all, in the fact that most of the Indian Ocean states have continued to stubbornly defend their own political and economic rights in opposition to imperialism, and they are striving to strengthen their own independence.

Whereas in the countries of the Indian Ocean Basin a growing alarm is being caused by the escalation of the military presence in this region, in Beijing there are no words of condemnation to be found for the dangerous game with fire that the Pentagon has ventured to play. Moreover, the specific actions of the Chinese leaders, maintained in the spirit of their present-day policy, so characteristic of them, a policy of joining directly in a bloc with the most aggressive forces of imperialism, allows us to state that China bears no small portion of the responsibility for the absence of tranquility in this region.

Beijing's reaction to the construction of a military base on the island of Diego Garcia is a unique litmus-paper test for the PRC's policy with regard to the U. S. course in the region of the Indian Ocean, a course which, it is universally recognized, has become the principal obstacle for creating a zone of peace here. "The considerable American military presence, including the shifting of land forces, air force, and naval strength...this is what disturbs the Asian countries today," writes the Indian scholar of international affairs, P. Parakal [?]. "And this presence continues to grow even further with the tacit approval of the Maoists, as is evident from the example of the base constructed on Diego Garcia."

In this connection there is considerable grounds for assuming that, in carrying out its military escalation in the Indian Ocean Basin, the United States is undertaking to take into consideration the analogous position of the Chinese leadership and is according it a favorable evaluation. Certain U. S. political and military leaders are clearly counting on finding a common language with China, based on Beijing's anti-Soviet course. In particular, this was directly stated by the commander of the U. S. Navy in the Pacific Ocean, Admiral G. McCain [?], who emphasized that he would not exclude in the future American-Chinese military cooperation in the Indian Ocean.

Recent facts testify to the close military-political joint action between the PRC and the United States in the struggle against the progressive, anti-imperialist and liberation processes in a number of regions of the Indian Ocean. For example, China and the United States operate on a "parallel basis" in relation to Iran. As is well-known, the results of the anti-shah revolution in that country brought on a sharply negative reaction not only in Washington but also in Beijing, which had linked with monarchist Iran far-reaching plans for drawing Teheran into the struggle against the "serious threat" from the "northern neighbor." When he was on a visit across the ocean in January 1979, Deng Xiaopeng in a speech before some journalists manifested serious anxiety regarding the situation in Iran, to influence which, in his words, China "could do practically nothing." The Chinese emissary called directly upon the United States "to intensify measures" in order to establish control over the situation in that country.

After the expulsion of the shah the Chinese special services began actively cooperating with the CIA in actions which were directed at subverting the anti-imperialist movement in Iran and at organizing anti-Soviet provocations here. The fact that the coincidence of Chinese and American interests in Iran, as proclaimed by Deng Xiaopeng, is not unsubstantiated is testified to, in particular, by the PRC's reaction to Washington's failed attempt to free the American hostages in Teheran. In Beijing not only were there no critical words to be found directed at the initiators of this adventuristic sortie, but they actually approved of this irrational and dangerous step.

The period of particular rapprochement between the courses of the PRC and the United States in the Indian Ocean region coincided with the Afghan events. The coordinated actions of these two countries in struggling against the gains made by the April Revolution actually spilled over into armed aggression against the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan]. Coordination of the actions regarding the interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs was manifested during the course of the visit to Beijing in January 1980 by former U. S. Secretary of Defense Brown. As this Pentagon chief declared, his trip was "of particular importance in the light of events in Afghanistan." During the course of the negotiations in the Chinese capital agreement was reached that each side would undertake appropriate steps, which "it was not feasible to disclose in detail."

Information provided by the mass news media of many countries has left no doubting the fact that by "appropriate steps" they had in mind measures for supplying arms to the Afghan insurgents and for organizing new military supplies to Pakistan with the same goal of activating outbreaks by these counter-revolutionaries operating from Pakistani territory. The Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA wrote in this regard that the "Beijing leadership in conjunction with the American administration is attempting to set Pakistan against Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. They (the Chinese--A. G.) were called upon to send military instructors to Pakistan and supply arms to that country." Further escalation of this dangerous partnership between the PRC and the United States in connection with the Afghan events was evidently served by the talks held in Tokyo on 10 July 1980 between Carter and Hua Guofeng. According to press information the former declared that the meeting had revealed identical viewpoints of the parties on a number of problems, including their approach to Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.

At the same time, it would be a simplification to regard such actions by Beijing in isolation from the hegemonist contents of its global foreign-policy strategy, which is directed at transforming China into a powerful state, dictating its own will to the nations. There is every reason to assume that the Indian Ocean zone, with its enormous population and economic potentials, occupies a position of no small importance in the great-power plans of the Chinese leadership.

Beijing's far-ranging calculations have not remained unnoticed in the political, scholarly, and public circles of many, above all, the coastal countries. "China is pursuing fully defined, hegemonistic goals in the Indian Ocean," writes the well-known Indian scholar, G. Vibhakar [?/] in this connection, emphasizing that "Beijing along with the Western countries bears a particular responsibility for the threat to peace and security in this region." Uttering his opinions with no less definiteness was the Indian political figure, D. S. Tiagi [?/], who noted that China "is coaxing over certain selected countries irrespective of the class nature of their regimes in an attempt to secure a break-through to the Indian Ocean."

It is impossible to disagree with this opinion. Provocation of tension between India and Pakistan, support of separatist and other anti-governmental movements in India, Burma, Sri Lanka, etc., an attempt to piece together a "fifth column" from persons of Chinese national background in the countries of Southeast Asia--this is a far from complete list of Beijing's actions aimed at penetrating the states of this region.



In the Chinese capital, however, judging by everything, they would not be averse to also acquiring levers of direct influence on the military-political situation in the Indian Ocean zone. In this connection, public opinion within the countries of this region cannot fail to be alarmed by the facts of Beijing's increasingly active inclusion in the race to step up naval forces. According to the estimates of Western specialists, the number of Chinese warships has doubled during the past decade. In December 1980 a secret Chinese-Pakistani agreement became known, according to which construction of a Chinese naval base began to the west of Karachi. This base, the construction of which is supposed to be completed within three years, will be furnished with American equipment.

Disturbed by the militaristic preparations of imperialism and the Maoists in the Indian Ocean Basin, the peoples of the countries located here have already for 15 years now been waging a struggle which at first was directed at preventing the appearance of a focus of tension in this region but now is pursuing a goal of eliminating it. Serving as one of the principal directions in the regional, foreign-policy course connected with solving this problem has been the advancement of the idea of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace.

The question of the need to block the military preparations of the non-coastal countries has been widely discussed at conferences of the non-alignment movement; it evolved, moreover, from the concept of a non-nuclear zone to a more all-encompassing idea of a zone of peace.

In its fullest form this idea was reflected in the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace which was adopted as Resolution No 2832 at the 26th Session of the UN General Assembly on 16 December 1971. This document solemnly proclaimed the Indian Ocean "together with its air space and its bottom to be a zone of peace forever." At the same time, the resolution in a general form defined the ways to implement its goals; it contained a call for the "great powers" to proceed without delay to enter into negotiations with the coastal countries of the Indian Ocean in order to bring about the following: in the first place, to put a halt to further escalation of the military presence in the Indian Ocean; in the second place, to eliminate in the Indian Ocean region all military bases, military facilities, rear-line services, nuclear installations, and weapons of mass destruction."

In January 1973 the UN Special Committee on the Indian Ocean, consisting of representatives from a number of countries in the region, began its activities. It was charged with the duty of studying the problem of working out practical measures for implementing the Declaration.

Upon the recommendation of the above-mentioned committee, the 29th Session of the General Assembly adopted a resolution which contained a call to the coastal and inland /continental/ states of the Indian Ocean Basin "to commence mutual consultations as soon as possible for the purpose of convoking a conference concerning the Indian Ocean."

Such a conference, in the opinion of its initiators, would be able to make a notable contribution to an extremely rapid solution to the problem of transforming the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace; it would facilitate the working out of practical measures along these lines. As a preparatory step toward this conference, a



conference of representatives from the coastal and inland states was held in July 1979 at the UN; here many participants in turn expressed their profound concern regarding the stepped-up military activities of the imperialist circles in the Indian Ocean.

The key positions of this conference's concluding document comprised the paragraphs about the need to eliminate all the foreign military bases existing in the region, about the inadmissability of the presence here of armed forces which would threaten the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of the states of this region. At the same time it affirmed the inalienable right of all countries to freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean.

In accordance with the results of this conference, the UN General Assembly decreed the convocation in 1981 in Colombo of an international conference on working out an agreement for transforming the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, and it entrusted the Special Committee with the task of carrying out its preparation, including the draft of its concluding document. In order to increase the efficiency of the Special Committee's activities, the General Assembly made the decision to expand its composition. Represented now within this UN organ are 45 states, including the permanent members of the Security Council, as well as Bulgaria, the GDR, Poland, and Rumania. It is indicative that the United States, having rejected the idea of conducting the conference this year, is thereby striving to break off its convocation.

In the coastal states as well as throughout the entire world they greeted with a great deal of interest and hope the new Soviet initiatives on ways to ensure peace and security in the region of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean as a whole. The Soviet peace program for this region, which proposes that no foreign military bases be created here, that no nuclear or any other weapons of mass destruction be deployed, that this region's countries not be drawn into military groupings, and that their sovereign right to their own natural resources be honored, has opened up new favorable prospects for ensuring the establishment of lasting peace and stability in the zone of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

The peoples of the countries located in the Indian Ocean Basin have a good idea where the threat to security in the region is coming from. In their growing unity and determination to oppose political blackmail and dictates lies the guarantee of doom for the ventures of imperialism and its Beijing partners.

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